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The starting point of our consideration on technological racing are stochastic models that view corporations as 
moving objects to approach a stochastic destination. A major focus is the strategic orientation of corporations in 
participating in such a race , revealing empirically observable phenomena such as 'catchup'  and 'leapfrogging', 
as supported by statistical measurements. Next to the analysis of behavioural patterns on the corporate or 
industry level is their aggregation on a national scale that extends to racing on economic growth among (groups 
of) countries. A major conjecture of the paper is that technological racing patterns on a micro scale reinforce 
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Motivation and Objectives 
a. Motivation 
The striking pattern that emerges in firms’ innovative activities is that the firms rival for a 
technological leadership position in situations best described as ‘races’. A ‘race’ is an 
interactive pattern characterized by firms constantly trying to get ahead of their rivals, or 
trying not to fall too far behind. In high technology industries, where customers are willing to 
pay a premium for advanced technology, leadership translates into increased returns in the 
market. Each race involves only a subset of the firms in the industry, and the activity within 
each race appears to strongly influence the behaviour of the firms within that race. 
Surprisingly, the races share broad similarities. In particular, firms that fall behind in their 
race display a robust tendency to accelerate innovative effort in order to catch up.  
Existing theory focuses on the impact of a single innovation at the firm level, or on the 
effect of a single ‘dominant design’ on an industry’s evolution. Like the dominant design 
literature, racing behaviour is also a dynamic story of how technology unfolds in an industry. 
In contrast to any existing way of looking at the evolution of technology, racing behaviour 
recognizes the fundamental importance of strategic interactions between competing firms. 
Thus firms take their rivals’ actions into account when formulating their own decisions. The 
importance of this characterization is at least two fold. At one level, racing behaviour has 
implications for understanding technology strategy at the level of the individual firm and for 
understanding the impact of policies that aim to spur technological innovation. At another 
level, racing behaviour embodies both traditions that previous writings have attempted to 
synthesize: the ‘demand-pull’ side emphasized by economic theorists and the ‘technology-
push’ side emphasized by the autonomous technical evolution school. It remains an open 
problem how technological races can be induced endogenously, e.g. by changes in economic 
variables (such as costs, prices and profitability). 
Our stochastic model of a race embraces several features that resemble moving objects 
towards a stochastic final destination. By exploring ‘hypercompetitive’ patterns of racing 
behaviour, in respective industries, we look into racing patterns of individual firms in view of 
their strategic responses to their racing environment. Among those features we identify is the 
speed race problem, the selection of an optimal decision point (t*), to optimize a gradient 
trajectory (of technological evolution) and to determine the ‘stopping line and the waiting 
region’. Such a model would be conducive to observations on innovation races in high 
technology industries, in particular, with race-type behaviours such as leapfrogging and 
catching-up, striking a balance between moving ahead , waiting and repositioning 
themselves.. The model can be improved by incorporating constraints . For example, 
constraints on an innovation path could be given by road blocks such as a bankruptcy 
constraint or an R&D uncertain payoff constraint. Some of these constraints may be 
conceptually easy to introduce, others may be tougher such as an investment constraint if the 
total innovation effort en route to t* plus the worst case would violate it. In such a case one 
may want to weigh the distant finishing line unproportionately. 
Beyond the micro-meso level of explaining changes in industry structures the model also 
addresses comparable issues on the macro level of global industry change. Aggregation of  8 
racing behaviour may result in catchup behaviour among countries that are the second subject 
level of our exploration. 
Simple catchup hypotheses put emphasis on the great potential of adopting unexploited 
technology in the early stage and the increase in the self-limiting power in the later stage. 
However, an actual growth path of technological trajectory of specific economy may 
overwhelmingly be constrained by social capability. And the capability endogenously changes 
as states of the economy and technology evolve. The success of economic growth due to 
diffusion of advanced technology or the possibility of leapfrogging is mainly attributable to 
how the social capability evolves, i.e., which effects become more influential, growing 
responsiveness to competition or growing obstacles to it on account of vested interests and 
established positions. 
 
b.   Objectives 
 (a)  A key objective  is to explore and explain which type of ‘racing behaviour’ is prevalent 
in global high technology industries, as exemplified by information technology ( 
computer and telecommunications ) industries. The pattern evolving from such  racing 
behaviour would be benchmarked against the frontier racing type of the global 
technological leaders.  
(b)  Another objective is to draw policy inferences on market structure, entrepreneurship, 
innovation activity, industrial policy and regulatory frameworks in promoting and 
hindering industry frontier races in a global industrial context.  
(c)  Given the statistical profile of technological evolution and innovation for respective 
global industries  as it relates to competitive racing and rivalry among the leading firms. 
Among the performance criteria to be assessed are frequency of frontier pushing, 
technological domination period, innovations vs. imitations in the race, innovation 
frequency when behind or ahead, nature of jumps, leapfrogging or frontier sticking, 
inter-jump times and jump sizes and race closeness measures. 
(d) An empirical proliferation of racing in these global industries can be explored,   
comprising of datasets identifying ‘relationship between technological positions (ranks) 
of firms in successive years’ (15 year period). 
(e)  Do observed racing patterns in  respective industries  contribute to equilibrium and stable 
outcomes in the world economy ? To which extent are cooperative ventures (global 
governance) between states justified to intervene? In particular we investigate the claim, 
as put forward by the Group of Lisbon (1995) that as a likely future scenario triadization 
will remain ‘the prevailing form of economic globalization’, in view of observations that 
increased intensity in racing patterns within key industries could lead to instability and 
welfare losses in triadization. 
(g)  More specifically, in an era of ongoing deregulation, privatization, liber- alization and 
lifting of trade barriers, we explore whether industry racing patterns are sufficiently 
controlled by open world-wide markets or whether complementary international 
agreements (regulations, controls) are needed to eliminate or mitigate negative  9 
externalities (without compromising the positive externalities that come with industry 
racing). 
The effects of racing patterns on the industrial organization of particular industries are 
assessed: how does the behaviour of leading firms influence the subcontracting relation 
between the purchasing firms and their subcontractors that is ,  which racing pattern induces a 
strengthening of their vertical links and what behaviour of the parent firm in technological 
racing encourages their subcontractors to be technologically (and thus managerially) 
independent? 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review the state of research in the industrial 
economics of technological racing. Then the model framework identifies the essential 
elements  under which racing patterns will occur. This will be complemented by empirical 
considerations of the diversity of complexity of racing patterrns, and the measurement 
problems that result from there. 
 
State of research  
Economic models and observations on ‘technology races’ are the most direct intellectual 
precursor to this paper (Reinganum, 1989, Scherer, 1991, Tirole, 1988). This follows from the 
tradition of investigating the varied implications of the notion, first advanced by Schumpeter, 
that it is the expectation of supernormal profits from the temporary monopoly position 
following an innovation that is the chief driver of R & D investment. The simplest technology 
race model would be as follows. A number of firms invest in R & D. Their investment results 
in an innovation with the time spent in R & D subject to some uncertainty (Gottinger, 1989). 
However, a greater investment reduces the expected time to completion of R & D. The 
models investigate how many firms will choose to enter such a contest, and how much they 
will invest.  
Despite some extensive theoretical examination of technological races there have been 
very few empirical studies on the subject (Lerner, 1997) and virtually none in the context of 
major global industries, and on a comparative basis. This will be one major focus in this 
paper. 
Technological frontiers at the firm and industry race levels offer a powerful tool through 
which to view evolving technologies within an industry. By providing a roadmap that shows 
where an individual firm is relative to the other firms in the industry, they highlight the 
importance of strategic interactions in the firm’s technology decisions. 
Does lagging behind one’s closest technological rivals cause a firm to increase its 
innovative effort ? The term ‘race’ suggests that no single firm would want to fall too far 
behind, and that every firm would like to get ahead. If a firm tries to innovate more when it is 
behind than when it is ahead, then ‘catchup’ behaviour will be the dominant effect. Once a 
firm gets ahead of its rivals enough, then rivals will step up their efforts to catch up. The 
leading firm will slow down its innovative efforts until its rivals have drawn uncomfortably 
close or have surpassed it. This process repeats itself every time a firm gets far enough ahead 
of its rivals. An alternative behaviour pattern would correspond to a firm increasing its 
innovative effort if it gets far enough ahead, thus making catchup by the lagging firms  10 
increasingly difficult. For any of these forms there appears to be a clear link to market and 
industry structure, as termed 'intensity of rivalry' by Kamien and Schwarz (1982).  We 
investigate two different kinds of races: one that is a frontier race among leaders and „would-
be“ leaders and another, that is a catchup race among laggards and imitators.  
These two forms had been applied  empirically to the development of the Japanese 
computer industry (Gottinger,1996), that is,  a frontier race model regarding the struggle for 
technological leadership in the global industry between IBM and ‘Japan Inc.’ guided by MITI, 
and a catchup race model relating to competition among the leading Japanese mainframe 
manufacturers as laggards.
1 
Furthermore, it is interesting to distinguish between two kinds of catchup behaviour. A 
lagging firm might simply try to close the gap between itself and the technological leader at 
any point in time (‘frontier-sticking’ behaviour), or it might try to actually usurp the position 
of the leader by ‘leapfrogging’ it. When there are disproportionately large payoffs to being in 
the technical lead (relative to the payoffs that a firm can realize if it is simply close enough to 
the technical frontier), then one would expect that leapfrogging behaviour would occur more 
frequently than frontier-sticking behaviour (Owen and Ulph, 1994). Alternatively, racing 
toward the frontier creates the ‘reputation’ of being an innovation leader facilitating to 
maintain and increase market share in the future (Albach, 1997). All attempts to leapfrog the 
current technogical leader might not be successful since many lagging firms might be 
attempting to leapfrog the leader simultaneously and the leader might be trying to get further 
ahead simultaneously. Correspondingly, one should distinguish between attempted 
leapfroggings and realized leapfroggings. The leapfrogging phenomenon (though dependent 
on industry structure)  appears as the predominant behaviour pattern in the US and Japan 
frontier races (Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon, 1991), Albach (1993) cites studies for Germany 
that show otherwise.  
Leapfrogging behaviour influenced by the expected size of payoffs as suggested by Owen 
and Ulph (1994) might be revised in compliance with the characteristics of industrial structure 
of the local (regional) markets, the amount of R&D efforts for leapfrogging and the extent of 
globalization of the industry. Even in the case where the payoffs of being in the technological 
lead is expected disproportionately large, the lagging firms might be satisfied to remain close 
enough to the leader so as to gain or maintain a share in the local market. This could occur 
when the amount of R&D efforts (expenditures) required for leapfrogging would be too large 
for a lagging firm to be viable in the industry and when the local market has not been open 
enough for global competition: the local market might be protected for the lagging local firms 
under the auspices of measures of regulation by the government (e.g. government purchasing, 
controls on foreign capital) and the conditions preferable for these firms (e.g. language, 
marketing practices). When the industrial structure is composed of multi-product firms, as for 
example, in the Japanese computer industry, sub-frontier firms may derive spillover benefits 
in developing new products in other technologically related fields (e.g. communications 
 
1  A catchup race is likely to occur when innovators fall too far behind in a frontier race or if innovators turn to 
imitators and follow just one or several leaders. It could also occur in markets that are saturated or 
technologically mature with a lack of breakthroughs.Therefore, at some point every frontier race can turn into 
a catchup whereas it is more difficult to imagine that any catchup race will turn into a frontier race.  11 
equipment, consumer electronic products). These firms may prefer an R&D strategy just to 
keep up with the technological frontier level (catch-up) through realizing a greater profit 
stream over a whole range of products. 
What are the implications of the way the firms split cleanly into the two technology races, 
with one set of firms clearly lagging the other technologically? The trajectories of 
technological evolution certainly seem to suggest that firms from one frontier cannot simply 
jump to another trajectory. Witness, in this regards, the gradual process necessary for the 
firms in the Japanese frontier to catch up with the global frontier firms. There appears to be a 
frontier ‘lock-in’ in that once a firm is part of a race, the group of rivals within that same race 
are the ones whose actions influence the firm’s strategy the most. Advancing technological 
capability is a cumulative process. The ability to advance to a given level of technical 
capability appears to be a function of existing technical capability. Given this ‘path 
dependence’, the question remains: why do some firms apparently choose a path of 
technological evolution that is less rapid than others? We propose two sets of possible 
explanations, which need not to be mutually exclusive. The first explanation hinges primarily 
on the expensive nature of R&D in industries like the computer industry which rely on novel 
scientific discovery for their advancement. Firms choosing the subfrontier will gain access to 
a particular technical level later than those choosing the frontier, but will do so at a lower cost. 
Expending fewer resources on R&D ensures a slower rate of technical evolution. The second 
explanation relates mainly to technological spillovers. Following the success of the frontier 
firms in achieving a certain performance level, this fact becomes known to the subfrontier 
firms. In fact, leading edge research in the computer industry is usually reported in scientific 
journals and is widely disseminated throughout the industry. The hypothesis is that partial 
spillover of knowledge occurs to the subfrontier firms, whose task is then simplified to some 
extent. Notice that the subfrontier firms still need to race to be technological leaders, as 
evidenced by the analysis above. This implies that the spillovers are nowhere near perfect. 
Firm specific learning is still the norm. However, it is possible that knowing something about 
what research avenues have proved successful (for the frontier firms) could greatly ease the 
task for the firms that follow and try to match the technical level of the frontier firm.  
 
A Model Framework for a Simple Stochastic Race  
The concept of a race is intrinsic to sports events, crossing the finishing line first is 
everything to a racer, the rewards may be immense by reaching for the gold. In general, if 
such a race evolves, the race looks like a sequential machine (finite automaton) acting under 
resource and time constraints, until a winner clearly emerges. A winner may establish himself 
at the first trials or runs, leaving very little chance for those left behind to catchup. The 
situation of competitive rivalry among firms or businesses in high technology industries may 
resemble more complex paradigms of a race that appear more difficult to describe than a 
sports event. First of all, the finishing line may not be sharply defined. It could be a greater 
market share than any of the rivals attain, it may be a higher profitability given the share, or a 
higher growth potential. In terms of process, it could be even a slow race at the beginning 
which might accelerate to whatever the finishing line constitutes of. It may be a race that is 
open to new entrants along the way, in a dormant, low innovation - driven industry that brings 
changes to this industry. It may allow moves among rivals, unheard of in conventional races, 
such as "leapfrogging", "take a breath and recharge" or redefining a new race through mergers  12 
and acquisitions, in the course of the given one. Races may be endogeneous, induced by 
changes in innovation patterns, market structures and productivity cycles. All these issues of 
complexity may justify to set up a racing model that captures many of the essential features. 
This would be a model of a stochastic race which is proposed. Let us describe the 
characteristics of such a race on achieving technological and market supremacy , a universal 
mathematical tretment is given in Gottinger (2000). A finishing line would be ahead of a 
present technological frontier which would be the common ground for starting the race. 
Let TF(C) be each racing company's technological knowledge frontier while TF(I) would 
be the respective industry's frontier represented by the most advanced company as a 
benchmark. All firms engage in pushing their frontier forward which determines the extent to 
which movements in the individual TF(C) of the racing firms translate into movements of the 
TF(I). While a variety of situations may emerge, the extremal cases involve: either one firm 
may push the frontier at all times, with the others following closely behind or all firms share 
more or less equally in the task of advancing the TF(I). The first situation corresponds to the 
existence of a unique technogical leader for a particular race, and a number of quick 
followers. The other situation corresponds to the existence of multiple technological leaders. 
In some industries firms share the task for pushing the frontier forward more equally than in 
other industries. This is usually the  case the more high paced and dynamic is the race in an 
industry. In any race of the sort "closeness" is an important but relative attribute. The races 
are all close by construction, however, some might be closer than others. As a closeness 
measure of the race at any particular time one could define  
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where  N(t) is the number of active firms in that industry at time t. The measure thus 
constructed has a lowest value of 0, which corresponds to a ‘perfectly close’ race. Higher 
values of the measure correspond to races that are less close. Unlike other characteristics such 
as the domination period length during a race, innovation when ahead versus when behind, 
leapfrogging versus frontier sticking, which describe the behaviour of a particular feature of 
the race and of a particular firm in relation to the frontier, the closeness measure is more of an 
aggregate statistic of how close the various racing parties are at a point in time. The closeness 
measure is simply an indication of the distance to approach a benchmark, and it does not say 
anything about the evolution of the technological frontier. To see this, note that if none of the 
frontiers were evolving, the closeness measure would be 0, as it would if all the frontiers were 
advancing in perfect lock-step with one another. 
The Problem: On an Euclidean plane let N be a set of n points (xi,yi); i = 1,... n ; let n 
probabilities pi;i = 1,... , n be given such that Spi = 1. We use the Euclidean distance on a 
plane because innovation characteristics are at least two-dimensional, that is, it would apply to 
so-called system products that consist of at least two components. The probabilities will most 
likely be subjective probabilities determined by the individual firm’s chances to position itself 
, endogeneously determined by its distance to the finishing line or  its  proximity to the next 
rival in the race. They may be formed by considering the firm’s own position in the race as 
well as depending on the stochasticity of the rivals’ efforts. As a first approximation we may 
let the firm’s R&D investment xi, in relation to the total investment of  its  rivals  S xj , 
determine the probability pi = xi/å xj .Let a starting point, point (x0,y0) or (point 0) also be 
given; let c(S); S ³ 0 be a function such that  13 
 (1)    c(0) = 0, 
 (2)    c(S) > 0;  for all S > 0, 
 (3)    c(S + e) ³ c(S); for all S, e > 0, 
and such that except for S = 0, c(S) is (not necessarily strictly) convex and represents the cost 
of racing at speed S; let F > 0 be given (the fixed time value); and finally let T > 0 be given 
(the decision period). It is required to minimize the following function by choosing t º (xt,yt) 
and S (i.e., choose a point t, to be at T time units from now, and a speed S with which to 
proceed afterwards, so that the expected total cost to cross the 'finishing line' will be 
minimized): 
(4)     Z(t,S) = FT + c(d(0,t)/T)d(0,t) + (c(S) + F/S)  å pid(t,i) 
where d(i,j) is the Euclidean distance between points i and j. The Euclidean distance can be 
seen as a metric how close the destination has been hit. The last term of (4) indicates the 
mixture of costs of speed racing and the cost of the time resource weighted by the 
probabilities of reaching alternative stochastic destinations.  
 We denote the optimal S by S*, and similarly we have t* and Z* = Z(t*,S*). Note that FT 
is a constant, so we can actually neglect it; the second term is the cost of getting to t during T 
time units, i.e., at a speed of d(0,t)/T. Now, clearly the problem of finding S* can be solved 
separately, and indeed we outline the steps toward solution..  
 
The Speed Race Problem 
If we look at the list of stipulations for c(S), (1) just means that we can stop and wait at 
zero marginal cost (which we first keep as a strict assumption to justify the flexibility of the 
race). (2) is evident, and (3) is redundant, given (1), since if c is not monotone for S > 0, then 
it has a global minimum for that region at some S, say Smin, where the function assumes the 
value cmin<c(S) for all S > 0. Now suppose we wish to move at a speed of lSmin; le (0,1], 
during T time units, thus covering a distance of lTSmin; then who is to prevent us from 
waiting (1 - l)T time units, and then go at Smin during the remaining lT time units, at a 
variable cost of cmin per distance unit? As for the convexity requirement, which we actually 
need from Smin and up only, this is not a restriction at all! Not only do all the firms we 
mentioned behave this way in practice generally, but even if they did not, we could use the 
convex support function of c as our 'real' c, by a policy, similar to the one discussed above, of 
moving part time at a low speed and part time at a higher one at a cost which is a linear 
convex combination of the respective c's. Hence, our only real assumption is that we can stop 
and wait at zero cost, i.e., (1). 
Lemma: let c(S); S>0 be any positive cost function associated with moving at speed S 
continuously and let (1) hold, then by allowing mixed speed strategies, we can obtain a 
function c(S); S > 0 such that c is positive, monotone nondecreasing and convex, and reflects 
the real variable costs.  14 
Now, since each time unit cost is F, and we can go S distance units during it, each distance 
unit's 'fair share' is F/S. To this add f(S), to obtain the cost of a distance unit at a speed of S 
when the firm knows where it is going, and requires their fixed costs to be covered. (On the 
other hand, not knowing what it wants to do means that the firm has to lose the F money, or 
part of it.) Denote the total cost as above by TC(S), or  TC(S) = c(S) + F/S. 
But, F/S is strictly convex in S, and c(S) is convex too, so TC(S) is strictly convex.  
 
Choosing t Optimally 
Our problem is to find the point t, or the 'decision point', where we elect to be at the end of 
th e  d e ci si on  p e ri od .  T h en ,  w e  wi l l  kn ow  w i th  ce r ta i n ty  wh a t w e  h av e  t o d o,  s o w e  w i l l  
proceed at S* to whichever point i is chosen, at a cost of TC(S*)d(t,i). Denoting TC(S*) = 
TC*, we may rewrite (4) as follows: 
  Z(t) = FT + c(d(0,t)/T)d(0,t) + TC* å pid(t,i). 
 
Theorem:   Z(t) is strictly convex in t.  
Proof: Clearly FT is a constant so it is convex. Let h(w) = c(w/T)w, hence our second term, 
c(d(0,t)/T)d(0,t) is h(d(0,t)). By differentiation we can show that h(w) is strictly convex, 
monotone increasing and nonnegative. d(0,t) is convex (being a norm), and it follows that 
h(d(0,t)) is strictly convex as well (see Theorem 5.1 in Rockafellar(1970), for instance), As 
for the third term it is clearly convex (since {pi}i=1, ... n are nonnegative probabilities), and 
our result follows for the sum. 
 
The Stopping Line and the Waiting Region 
For T ³ T*, we obtain S = Smin, and by W(S) = c(S) + Sc'(S)  it follows that W(S)  = 
cmin.  For G(t*) = W(S) we have 
(6)     G(t*) = cmin. 
Now, starting at different points, but such that G(0) > cmin and T > T* as defined for them 
we should stop at different decision points respectively . Actually there is a locus of points 
satisfying (6), which we call D as follows 
(7)     D = { t e E2 |G(t) = cmin} . 
We call D the stopping line (although it may happen to be a point). Now denote the area 
within D, inclusive, as C, or 
(8)     C = { t e E2|G(t) £ cmin }.  15 
C is also called the waiting area, since being there during the decision period would imply 
waiting. Clearly C Í D, with C = D for the special case where one of the points N È 0 is the 
only solution for a large T. In case C ¹ D, however, we have a nonempty set E as follows 
(9)     E = C - D (or C/D). 
Specifically, there is a point in C, and in E if E ¹ Æ, for which G = 0 . We denote this point 
by tmin, i.e., 
(10)     G(tmin) = 0. 
Clearly, in order to identify tmin, we do not need any information about the starting point 
or any of the costs we carry, but just the information on N and {pi} 
 
Statistical Measurements of  Industrial Racing Patterns 
The point of departure for a statistical analysis of industrial racing patterns is that the 
technological frontier is in fact a reasonable indicator of the evolving state of the knowledge 
(technical expertise) in the industry. At any point in time the “industry frontier” (ITF) 
indicates the degree of technical sophistication of the most advanced product in the industry, 
in a sense described below. Firm level technology frontiers (FTF) are constructed analogously 
and indicate, at any point in time, the extent of the technical sophistication achieved by any 
firm  until that point in time. The study focusses on the evolution of the European firm and 
industry level technology frontiers vs. North America and Japan. 
In the context of this study we define ‘race’ as a continual contest for technological 
superiority among some subset of firms within a well defined industry (classification). Under 
this conceptualisation a race is characterised by a number of firms whose FTF’s remain 
‘close’ together over a period of 20 to 25 years. The distinctive element is that firms engaging 
in a race have FTF’s substantially closer together than the FTFs of any firms not in the race. A 
statistical analysis should reflect that a race, as defined, may or may not have different firms 
in the leadership position at different times, may be a tighter race at some times than at others, 
and in general, may exhibit a variety of forms of industrial behaviour. 
We present three cases of high technology industries for which we demonstrate the 
construction of statistical indicators reflecting racing patterns in those industries, (1) 
biotechnology, (2) semiconductors/computers and telecommunications equipment. We choose 
those industries because they are identified as the major components of a technology based 
network industry reflecting the cutting edge of the science / technology frontier in the world 
economy. Statistical indicators reflecting the technology race in those industries provide 
intrinsic information on knowledge leadership position, competitive advantage and level of 
welfare and wealth creation in the economies involved. Thus, they will be of significant value 
to policy analysis of economic growth and development. The data set is comprised of product 
offerings by major European , American and Japanese firms in those industries from the 
period 1975-2000, assembled from and cross-checked by a range of historical sources, field 
studies and expert opinions.  16 
.… 
Methodology. Based on previous work on stochastic modelling of innovation races, we look 
for clusters of firms whose FTFs remain close enough throughout the 25 year period (formal 
measures of closeness are defined and measured). We identify at least 2 races in progress in 
the industries throughout the 25 years of duration. One comprises the world frontier race in 
each of those industries, the other the European frontier race which technically would 
constitute a subfrontier to the world (sometimes complemented by the Japanese race). Since 
the data set by no means exhaust the firms in the industry, it is certainly easier to accept that 
these are the significant technological races in progress. The technology frontier of the firms 
in a particular race (that is ITF) is constructed in a manner similar to the individual FTFs. 
Essentially, the maximal envelope of the FTF’s in a particular race constitute the ITF for that 
race. So the ITF indicates, as a function of calendar time, the best achievable performance by 
any firm in the race. 
 
Characterisation of Statistical Indicators of Industrial Racing 
The empirical explorations examine the features of the innovative process that are common 
to all the races, and those that distinguish between them. This will help us understand some of 
the similarities and differences between different technology strategies that the races appear to 
represent. A frontier is ‘pushed’ forward when the performance level of the technology (for 
the firm in case of FTF and for the racing group of firms in the case of ITF) is being 
enhanced. 
For example, to which extent are different firms in each race responsible for pushing the 
frontier forward (i.e. to which extent are movements in the individual FTFs of the racing firms 
translated into movements of the ITF)? 
While a variety of situations are possible, the extremes are the following: (a) one firm may 
push the frontier at all times, with the others following closely behind, (b) all firms share 
more or less equally in the task of advancing the ITF. Extreme situation (a) corresponds to the 
existence of a unique technological leader for a particular race, and a number of quick 
followers. Situation (b), on the other hand, corresponds to the existence of multiple 
technological leaders. 
 (a) Assessment of Frontier Pushing. The relevant  statistics for the two races are given in 
Table 1 in illustrative terms. 
 
TABLE 1: PUSHING THE FRONTIER (ILLUSTRATIVE) 
NUMBER OF TIMES EACH FIRMS PUSHES THE FRONTIER 
 
Firm    #  1  2  3  4  5  6  total 
World  frontier  6 3 2  -  - -  11 
EU Subfrontier  4  1  0  2  1  2  10 
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(b)  Domination Period Statistics. Accepting the view that a firm has greater potential to earn 
rents from its technological position if it is ahead or its race suggests that it would be 
interesting to examine the duration of time for which a firm can expect to remain ahead 
once it finds itself pushing its ITF. We define statistically the ‘domination period’ to be 
the duration of time for which a firm leads its particular race. The domination period 
tends to be a more uncertain quantity in the world frontier race than in the EU frontier 
race (as evidenced by the lower domination period standard deviation in Table 2) 
 
TABLE 2 DOMINATION PERIOD STATISTICS (ILLUSTRATIVE) 
 
  Mean (years)  Std. Dev. (years)  n 
World frontier  3.44  5.19  9 
EU frontier  3.88  2.20  8 
 
 
(c)  Catchup Statistics. If a firm tries to innovate more when it is behind then when it is 
ahead, then ‘catch up’ behaviour will be the dominant effect. (Evidence that catch up 
behaviour is the norm is provided by data from the US and Japanese computer industry). 
Extending this evidence to illustrate our innovation race statistics, we make up Table 3A 
 
TABLE 3A     MORE INNOVATIONS WHEN BEHIND OR AHEAD (ILLUSTRATIVE)  
WORLD FRONTIER 
 
Firms  #  1  2  3  Total 
Total  innovations  7 8 3  18 
Number when ahead  3  2  0  5 
% when ahead  *  43  25  0  28 
%  of time ahead**  81  10  20   
 
TABLE 3A     MORE INNOVATIONS WHEN BEHIND OR AHEAD (ILLUSTRATIVE)  
EU  FRONTIER 
 
Firms   #  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
Total  innovations  9  3 6 5 2  2  27 
Number when ahead  2  0  1  1  0  1  5 
% when ahead  *  22  0  17  20  0  50  19 
%  of time ahead**  29  47  3  36  18  75   
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TABLE 3A     MORE INNOVATIONS WHEN BEHIND OR AHEAD (ILLUSTRATIVE)  
JAPAN  FRONTIER 
 
Firms   #  1  2  3  Total 
Total innovations  8  6  10  24 
Number when ahead  2  2  3  7 
% when ahead  *  25  33  30  29 
%  of time ahead**  16  45  52   
One tailed difference of means t test:: % when ahead vs. % of time ahead: t=1.62, d.f.=22, p<0.06 
* percentage of innovations occurring when firm leads its race 
** percentage of time that a firm leads its race 
     
For each firm, this table compares the fraction of the total innovations carried out by the 
firms (i.e. the fraction of the total number of times that the FTF advanced) when the firm in 
question was leading its race with the fraction of time that the firm actually led its race. In the 
absence of catch-up behaviour, or behaviour leading to a firm increasingly dominating its 
rivals, we would expect to see no difference in these fractions. Then the fraction of time that a 
firm is ahead of its race could be an unbiased estimator of the fraction of innovations that it 
engages in when it is ahead. 
The data, however, suggest that this is not the case. Difference of means tests indicate that 
the fraction of time that a firm leads its race is larger than the fraction of innovations that 
occur when the firm is ahead, i.e. more innovations occur when the firm is lagging than would 
by expected in the absence of catch-up or increasing dominance behaviour. Catch-up 
behaviour is supported by additional observations, as in Table 3B, that the firms make larger 
jumps (i.e. the FTF advances more) when they are behind than when they are leading the race. 
 
TABLE 3B FIRM JUMP SIZES LARGER WHEN  BEHIND OR AHEAD? 
 
 When  Ahead  When  Behind 
  Mean Jump Size  Number of Jumps  Mean Jump size  Number of Jumps 
World  frontier  2.37  5  2.92  12 
EU frontier  2.84  4  2.82  22 
Japan frontier  6.41  7  8.41  17 
 
 (d) Leapfrogging Statistics. From this, the distinction emerges between two kinds of catch-
up. A lagging firm might simply try to close the gap between itself and the technological 
leader at any point in time (frontier-sticking behaviour), or it might try to actually usurp 
the position of the leader by ‘leapfrogging’ it when there are disproportional larger 
payoffs in being in the technical lead (relative to the payoffs that a firm can realize if it is  19 
simply close enough to the technical frontier), then one would expect that leapfrogging 
behaviour would occur more frequently than frontier-sticking behaviour. 
  Tables 4 and 5 describe the results of some analyses of this leapfrogging/frontier-sticking 
phenomenon. All attempts to leapfrog the current technological leader might not be 
successful since many lagging firms might be attempting to leapfrog the leader 
simultaneously. Correspondingly, we report both the attempted leapfroggings and the 
realized leapfroggings. It appears likely that the leapfrogging phenomenon would be 
more predominant in world frontier than in the EU frontier races.  
 
TABLE 4  NATURE OF JUMPS : LEAPFROGGING OR FRONTIER –STICKING  (ILLUSTRATIVE) 
 
  Total Jumps  Attempted Leapfrogs  Realised Leapfrogs 
World  frontier  18  15  ( 83%)  11 ( 61%) 
EU  frontier  27  13  ( 48% )  10  ( 37%) 
 
TABLE 5  INTER-JUMP TIMES AND JUMP SIZES (ILLUSTRATIVE) 
 
  Time and Jump Statistics summarising all FTFs 
  Inter-Jump Times  Jump Sizes 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
World  frontier  3.87 3.42 2.87 2.52 
EU frontier  3.59  2.76  2.95  1.94 
      
  Time and Jump Statistics summarising  ITFs 
  Inter-Jump Times  Jump Sizes 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
World frontier  2.90  2.0 9  2.02  1.02 
EU frontier  3.11  2.02  2.14  1.36 
 
(e)  Race Closeness Measure (RCM). None of the previous analyses tell us how close any of 
the overall races are over a period of time. The races are all close by construction, 
however, some might be closer than others, We define ‘a measure of closeness’ of a race 
(RCM) at a particular time as follows: RCM(t) =  S0
N [fi (t) – F(t )] 
2 /N(t) where  fi (t) is 
the firm's FTF at time t, F(t) is the ITF at time t = max [FTF(t)]  and N(t) is the number of 
active firms at time t. 
  The measure thus constructed has a lowest value of 0, which corresponds to a ‘perfectly 
close’ race. Higher values of the measure correspond to races that are less close. Unlike 
the earlier characteristics (domination period length, innovation when ahead versus when  20 
behind, leapfrogging versus frontier-sticking) which investigate the behaviour of a 
particular feature of the race and of a particular firm in relation to the race frontier, the 
RCM is more of an aggregate statistic of how close the various racing parties are at a 
point in time. The closeness measure is simply an indication of parity, and not one that 
says anything per se about the evolution of the technological frontier. To see this, note 
that if none of the frontiers were evolving, the closeness measure would be 0, as it would 
if all the frontiers were advancing in perfect lock-step with one another. 
 
(f)  Interfrontier Distance. How long does ‘knowledge’ take to spillover from frontier firms to 
subfrontier firms. This requires investigating “interfrontier distance”. One measure of 
how much subfrontier firms’ technology lags the frontier firms’ technology could be 
graphed as “subfrontier lag” in terms of calendar time. At each point in time , this is 
simply the absolute difference in the subfrontier performance time and the frontier 
performance time. The graph would clearly indicate that this measure has been  declining 
or increasing more or less monotonically over the past 25 years to the extent that the 
subfrontier firms have been able/unable to catch up with the frontier firms. A 
complementary measure would be to assess the difficulty of bridging the lag. That is, 
how much longer does it take the subfrontier to reach a certain level of technical 
achievement after the frontier has reached that level. Thus it might very well turn out that 
the interfrontier distance may be decreasing  though the difficulty in bridging the gap is 
increasing.  
  Another reason to analyze interfrontier distance is that it provides some indication of 
technological obsolescence in the industry. Another measure of interfrontier distance(a 
bridging difficulty measure) provides a lower bound on how long a technology lasts in 
the industry. This is so since a technology is actively used in the industry at least from the 
time that a frontier firm introduces it to the time that a subfrontier firm introduces it. The 
measure is a lower bound , since the actual life  of a technology will exceed this measure 
for a number of reasons. For one thing, firms that lag the frontier of their respective races 
will use the same technology later than the firms at the frontier. For anothe, recall that the 
FTFs were constructed using each firm’s most technically sophisticated product. The 
technology will presumably be around  for quite a while in less advanced products that 
the firm puts out (intra-firm diffusion of technology). 
 
Further Discussion 
The model sets out to examine and measure racing behaviour on technological positions 
among firms in high technology industries, as exemplified by the globally operating 
telecommunications equipment,semiconductor and computer industries . In measuring the 
patterns of technological evolution in these industries we attempt to answer questions about 
whether and to which extent their racing patterns differ from those firms in respective 
industries that do not operate on a global scale. Among the key issues we want to address is 
the apparent inability of technology oriented corporations to maintain leadership in fields that 
they pioneered. There is a presumption that firms fail to remain competitive because of 
agency problems or other suboptimal managerial behaviour within these organizations. An 
alternative hypothesis  is that technologically trailing firms, in symmetric competitive  21 
situations, will devote greater effort to innovation, so that a failure of technological leaders to 
maintain their position is an appropriate response to the competitive environment. In 
asymmetric situations, with entrants challenging incumbents, research could demonstrate 
whether startup firms show a stronger endeavour to close up to or leapfrog the competitors. 
Such issues would highlight the dynamics of the race within the given market structure in any 
of the areas concerned. We observe two different kinds of market asymmetries bearing on 
racing behaviour: (a) risk-driven and (b) resource based asymmetries. 
When the incumbents’ profit are large enough and do not vary much with the product 
characteristics, the entrant is likely to choose the faster, less aggressive option in each stage as 
long as he has not fallen behind in the race. The incumbent’s behaviour is influenced by what 
is known as the ‘replacement effect’ (Tirole, 1988). The conventional ‘replacement’ effect 
says that, in an effort to maximize the discounted value of its existing profit stream, the 
incumbent (monopolist) invests less in R & D than an entrant, and thus expects to be replaced 
by the entrant (in the case where the innovation is drastic enough that the firm with the older 
technology would not find it profitable to compete with the newer technology). In one of our 
models, when the incumbent’s flow profit is large enough, the same replacement effect causes 
the incumbent to be replaced only temporarily (if the innovation is drastic). Subsequently, she 
is likely to regain a dominant position in the market since she has a superior version of the 
new technology.  
In view of resource based asymmetries, we observe, as a firm’s stage resource endowment 
increases, it could use the additional resources to either choose more aggressive targets or to 
attempt to finish the stage quicker, or both. This hypothesis suggests two interpretations, 
suitable for empirical exploration: (a) if the demand for new products displays different 
elasticities for different local/regional markets, then we might expect there to be only 
imperfect correlation between aggressiveness and resource richness when products from 
different markets are grouped together, (b) if, however, demand for these products is not 
inelastic enough, then we would expect resource rich firms to aim for both higher speed in 
R&D and greater aggressiveness.  
A further point of exploration is whether chance leads result in greater likelihood of 
increasing lead, or in more catchup behaviour. Previous work in this regard (Grossman and 
Shapiro, 1987; Harris and Vickers, 1987) has suggested that a firm that surges ahead of its 
rival increases its investment in R&D and speeds up while a lagging firm reduces its 
investment in R&D and slows down. Consequently, previous work suggests that the lead 
continues to increase. However, based on related work for the US and Japanese 
telecommunications industry (Gottinger, 1996) when duopoly and monopolistic competition 
and product system complexity for new products are accounted for, the speeding up of a 
leading firm occurs only under rare circumstances. For example, a firm getting far enough 
ahead such that the (temporary) monopoly term dominates its payoff expression, will always 
choose the fast strategy, while a firm that gets far enough behind will always choose the slow 
and aggressive approach. Then the lead is likely to continue to increase. If, on the other hand, 
both monopoly and duopoly profits increase substantially with increased aggressiveness then 
even large leads can vanish with significant probability.  
Overall, this characterization highlights two forces that influence a firm’s choices in the 
various stages: proximity to the finish line and distance between the firms. This probability of 
reaping monopoly profits is higher the farther ahead a firm is of its rival, and even more so the 
closer the firm is to the finish line. If the lead firm is far from the finish line, even a sizeable  22 
lead may not translate into the dominance of the monopoly profit term, since there is plenty of 
time for the lead situation to be reversed and failure to finish first remains a probable 
outcome. In contrast, the probability that the lagging firm will get to be a monopolist becomes 
smaller as it falls behind the lead firm. This raises the following question. What kind of 
actions cause a firm to get ahead? Intuitively, one would expect that a firm that is ahead of its 
rival at any time t, in the sense of having completed more stages by time t, is likely to haven 
chosen the faster, less aggressive strategy more often. We will construct numerical estimates 
of the probability that a leading firm is more likely to have chosen a strategy less aggressively 
(faster) to verify this intuition.  
Moving away from the firm-led race patterns revolving in a particular industry to a 
clustering of racing on an industry level is putting industry in different geoeconomic zones 
against each other and becoming dominant in strategic product/process technologies. Here 
racing patterns among industries in a relatively free trade environment could lead to 
competitive advantages and more wealth creating and accumulating dominance in key product 
/ process technologies in one region at the expense of others. The question is, whether 
individual races on the firm level induce such like races on the industry level and if so, what 
controlling effects may be rendered by regional or multilateral policies on regulatory, trade 
and investment matters. 
Similar catchup processes are taking place between leaders and followers within a group of 
industrialized countries in pursuit of higher levels of productivity. Moses Abramovitz (1986) 
explains the central idea of the catch-up hypothesis as the trailing countries’ adopting 
behaviour of a ‘backlog of unexploited technology’. Supposing that the level of labour 
productivity were governed entirely by the level of technology embodied in capital stock, one 
may consider that the differentials in productivities among countries are caused by the 
‘technological age’ of the stock used by a country relative to its ‘chronological age’. The 
technological age of capital is an age of technology at the time of investment plus years 
elapsing from that time. Since a leading country may be supposed to be furnished with the 
capital stock embodying, in each vintage, technology which was ‘at the very frontier’ at the 
time of investment, ‘the technological age of the stock is, so to speak, the same as its 
chronological age’. While a leader is restricted in increasing its productivity by the advance of 
new technology, trailing countries  ‘have the potential to make a larger leap’ as they are 
provided with the privilege of exploiting the backlog in addition of the newly developed 
technology. Hence, followers being behind with a larger gap in technology will have a 
stronger potential for growth in productivity. The potential, however, will be reduced as the 
catch-up process goes on because the unexploited stock of technology becomes smaller and 
smaller. This hypothesis explains the diffusion process of best-practice technology and gives 
the same sort of S-curve change in productivity rise of catching-up countries among a group 
of industrialized countries as that of followers to the leader in an industry.  
Although this view can explain the tendency to convergence of productivity levels of 
follower countries, it fails to answer the historical puzzles why a country, the United States, 
has preserved the standing of the technological leader for a long time since taking over 
leadership from Britain in around the end of the last century and why the shifts have taken 
place in the ranks of follower countries in their relative levels of productivitiy, i.e., 
technological gaps between them and the leader. Abramovitz poses some extensions and 
qualifications on this simple catch-up hypothesis in the attempt to explain these facts. Among 
other factors than technological backwardness, he lays stress on a country’s ‘social 
capability’, i.e., years of education as a proxy of technical competence and its political,  23 
commercial, industrial, and financial institutions. The social capability of a country may 
become stronger or weaker as technological gaps close and thus, he states, the actual catch-up 
process ‘does not lend itself to simple formulation’.This view has a common understanding to 
what Mancur Olson (1996) expresses to be ‘public policies and institutions’ as his explanation 
of the great differences in per capita income across countries, stating that ‘any poorer 
countries that adopt relatively good economic policies and institutions enjoy rapid catch-up 
growth’. The suggestion should be taken seriously when we wish to understand the 
technological catching-up to American leadership by Japan, in particular, during the post-war 
period and explore the possibility of a shift in standing between these two countries. This 
consideration will directly bear on the future trend of the state of the art which exerts a crucial 
influence on the development of the world economy. 
Steering or guiding the process of racing through the pursuit of industrial policies aiming 
to increase competitive advantage of respective industries, as having been practised in Japan 
(Gottinger, 1996), in that it stimulates catchup races but appears to be less effective in 
promoting frontier racing. A deeper reason lies in the phenomenon of network externalities 
affecting high-technology industries. That is, racing ahead of rivals in respective industries 
may create external economies to the effect that such economies within dominant industries 
tend to improve their international market position and therefore pull ahead in 
competitiveness vis-a-vis their (trading) partners. 
As P. Krugman (1991, 1997) observed: ‘It is probably true that external economies are a 
more important determinant of international trade in high technology sectors than elsewhere’.  
The point is that racing behaviour in leading high technology industries by generating 
frontier positions create cluster and network externalities pipelining through other sectors of 
the economy and creating competitive advantages elsewhere, as supported by the ‘increasing 
returns’ debate (Arthur, 1996). In this sense we can speak of positive externalities 
endogenizing growth of these economies and contributing to competitive advantage. 
It is interesting to speculate on the implications of the way the firms in major high 
technology markets, such as telecommunications, split clearly into the two major technology 
races, with one set of firms clearly lagging the other technologically. The trajectories of 
technological evolution certainly seem to suggest that firms from one frontier cannot simply 
jump to another trajectory. Witness, in this regard, the gradual process necessary for the firm 
in the catchup race to approach those in the frontier race. There appears to be a frontier ‘lock-
in’ in that once a firm is part of a race, the group of rivals within that same race are the ones 
whose actions influence the firm’s strategy the most. Advancing technological capability is a 
cumulative process. The ability to advance to a given level of technical capability appears to 
be a function of exisitng technical capability. Given this path dependence, the question 
remains: why do some firms apparently choose a path of technological evolution that is less 
rapid than others. Two sets of possible explanations could be derived from our case analysis, 
which need not be mutually exclusive. The first explanation lingers primarily on the 
expensive nature of R & D in industries like telecommunications and computers which rely 
on novel discovery for their advancement. Firms choosing the catchup race will gain access to 
a particular technical level later than those choosing the frontier, but will do so at a lower cost. 
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